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Differentiating the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses
CARL H. ESBECK
The purpose of the Establishment Clause is not to safeguard indi-
vidual religious rights. That is the role of the Free Exercise Clause,
indeed its singular role. The purpose of the Establishment Clause,
rather, is as a structural restraint on governmental power. Because of
its structural character, the task of the Establishment Clause is to limit
government from legislating or otherwise acting on any matter "re-
specting an establishment of religion."' The powers that fall within the
scope of the foregoing clause (denied to government, hence within the
sole province of religion) and the powers outside this clause (hence,
authority vested in civil government) await elaboration below.
RIGHTS AND RESTRAINTS
The United States Constitution consists of individual rights and in-
stitutional structure. People (including organized groups of people)
have rights. Governments do not have rights. 2 Rather, governments
have powers and duties. The powers of the federal government are
enumerated and limited, an original understanding later made explicit
in the Tenth Amendment. Federal powers are delegated to one of
three branches, shared by specified branches, denied to all three, or
shared with the several states. These delegations and denials of power
* CARL H. ESBECK (B.S., Iowa State University; J.D., Cornell University School of Law)
is Isabella Wade and Paul C. Lyda Professor of Law at the University of Missouri, Columbia,
Missouri. He is editor of Religious Beliefs, Human Rights, and the Moral Foundation of
Western Democracy, and is autor of The Regulation of Religious Organizations as Recipi-
ents of Governmental Assistance. His articles have appeared in Iowa Law Review, Emory
Law Journal, Notre Dame Law Review, Washington and Lee Law Review, and the Hastings
Constitutional Law Quarterly. Special interests include government regulation of religious
organizations, church autonomy, government funding of faith-based social service providers,
and constitutional litigation.
1. The Establishment Clause, along with the Free Exercise Clause, reads "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof...." U.S. Constitution, amendment I.
2. See, e.g., Rodney A. Smolla, Smolla and Nimmer on Freedom of Speech, 3rd ed. (Deer-
field, Ill.: Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1996), §§ 19: 2 to 19: 4, at pp. 19-2 to 19-8 (stating
that although the Free Speech Clause restrains government speech in certain respects, the
Clause vests no free speech rights in government).
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constitute the institutional structure or architecture of the federal
government.
The difference between rights and structure within the overall
Constitution is commonplace.3 For government to avoid violating an
individual right is a matter of constitutional duty owed to each person
within its jurisdiction. This duty is personal, running in favor of each
rights holder. On the other hand, for government to avoid exceeding a
structural restraint is a matter of confining legislation and the actions of
its officials to the scope of its delegated powers. These restraints are
impersonal, running in favor of the entire body politic. 4 Although indi-
vidual rights can be waived because they are personal, institutional
structure cannot.5 The difference between rights and structure
manifests itself in additional but often subtle ways that can prove
definitive.6
A structural clause, to be sure, often has a laudable effect on indi-
vidual liberty by compelling various branches of the government (legis-
3. See, e.g., Daan Braveman, et al., Constitutional Law: Structure and Rights in Our Fed-
eral System, 3' ed. (New York: Mathew Bender, 1996), v-vi, 153, 193, 257, 365-66; Gerald
Gunther, Constitutional Law, 12' ed. (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1991), :,xd to x Xv(devoting chapters 2-6 to governmental structure and chapters 7-15 to individual rights;
Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 2'd ed. (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press,
1988), §§ 2-1 to 2-4, at pp. 18-22. See ibid. at § 7-1, at 546-48, concerning the limited
protection for personal rights in the original body of the Constitution, except indirectly
through the structuring of a government with limited, enumerated powers.
4. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998), striking down the federal
line item veto act as violative of separation of powers. Justice Kennedy distinguished be-
tween rights and structure as he noted how liberty is the end result of both:
In recent years, perhaps, we have come to think of liberty as defined by that word in
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and as illuminated by the other provisions of
the Bill of Rights. The conception of liberty embraced by the Framers was not so
confined. They used the principles of [structure] to secure liberty in the fundamen-
tal political sense of the term, quite in addition to the idea of freedom from [individ-
ually] intrusive governmental acts.
Ibid. at 449, 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
5. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982)
at 702-03 (contrasting personal jurisdiction as an "individual liberty" that can be waived with
structural restraints, such as limits on subject matter jurisdiction, that are a "restriction on
... power ... as a matter of sovereignty" and thus cannot be waived); Clinton v. City of New
York, 524 U.S. 417, (1998) at 449, 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining that structural
clauses cannot be voluntarily surrendered, yielded up, or abdicated by Congress).
6. See, e.g., Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439 (1991) (holding that the Dormant Commerce
Clause is a rights-securing clause rather than a power-limiting clause of the Constitution,
thus actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 providing for redress of rights deprivation); Golden
State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989) at 107-08 (holding that the
Supremacy Clause is not a rights-securing clause but a power-allocating clause requiring
that federal law prevail when there is a conflict with a law based on state power, thus not
actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 providing for redress of rights deprivation); ibid. at 116
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (distinguishing a constitutional right from "those interests merely
resulting from the allocation of power" between governmental entities).
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lative, executive, and judicial) to stay within their authority.7
Nevertheless, the immediate object of constitutional structure is the
management of power: a dividing, dispersing, and balancing of the vari-
ous prerogatives of sovereignty. "Separation of powers" and "federal-
ism" are mere shorthand for familiar forms of constitutional structure
running horizontally and vertically, respectively, within the three-
branch federal government and the multilayered system of national,
state, and local governments. Structural clauses are helpfully thought
of as power conferring and power limiting, so long as it is understood
that many such clauses serve both functions.8
A "NEGATIVE" ON THE GOVERNMENT'S POWER
The Bill of Rights did not confer new powers on Congress.9 The
fears of the Anti-federalists, who were prominent in the First Congress,
7. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) at 921-22 (explaining how individual liberty
flows consequentially from the Constitution's structure); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995) at 552 (explaining how structure has the object of preventing the accumulation of
excessive power in any single government or branch thereof, and the successful achievement
of that diffusion of power consequentially ensures the protection of liberty).
8. The Commerce Clause, for example, both confers power on Congress (Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (upholding federally issued coasting license in the face
of a state-granted steamboat monopoly)), and the Clause sets limits on that power (United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down federal law criminalizing mere posses-
sion of firearms near a school)). A structural clause can have this dual function because, as
expressed in the Tenth Amendment, powers not delegated to the federal government are
reserved to the states or to the people.
9. In a speech before the House introducing his draft of the proposed amendments, James
Madison described their purpose as follows: "the great object in view is to limit and qualify
the powers of Government, by excepting out of the grant of power those cases in which the
Government ought not to act, or to act only in a particular mode." Annals of Congress 1, ed.
Joseph Gales (Washington, D.C.: Gales & Seaton, 1789), 454. In The Legal Tender Cases, 79
U.S. 457 (1870), the Supreme Court observed:
The preamble to the [congressional] resolution submitting [the Bill of Rights to the
states] for adoption recited that the "conventions of a number of the states had, at
the time of their adopting the Constitution, expressed a desire, in order to prevent
misconstruction or abuse of [federal] powers, that further declaratory and restrictive
clauses should be added." .. . Most of [the proposed] amendments are denials of
power which had not been expressly granted, and which cannot be said to have been
necessary and proper for carrying into execution any other powers. Such, for exam-
ple, is the prohibition of any laws respecting the establishment of religion, prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.
Ibid., 535. The Preamble in its entirety is reproduced at 5 The Founders' Constitution, eds.
Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner (Norman, Okla.: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1987), 40-
41. See also United States v. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. 2218, 2223-24 (1998) (stating that the re-
ceived understanding of the Bill of Rights is that it was instituted to restrict the powers of
the national government); Edward Dumbauld, The Bill of Rights And What It Means Today,
(Chicago, Ill.: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1957), 105; Leonard W. Levy, The Establishment
Clause: Religion and the First Amendment (New York: MacMillan Pub. Co., 1986), 84; Leo-
nard W. Levy, "The Establishment Clause," in How Does the Constitution Protect Religious
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drove them to just the opposite objective: to deny ("negative") power to
interfere with liberties that might otherwise be implied from the more
open-ended delegations in the original Constitution. 10 The Federalists
gave little resistance to this enterprise because their position all along
had been that the new central government had never been delegated
such powers." Indeed, James Madison, a Federalist and principal
drafter of the Constitution proper, led the cause for a Bill of Rights. So
Congress settled on the exact text of the proposed articles of amend-
ment in late September 1789 with relative ease. 12 Twelve articles were
submitted to the states, but only ten were ratified. 13 The ratified
amendments were thought to change little, but they did calm the fears
of citizens while serving as a useful hedge against possible future en-
Freedom?, eds. Robert A. Coldwin and Art Kaufman (Washington, D.C.: American Enter-
prise Institute, 1987), 69, 83, 89-90.
10. See Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 2,50 (1833)
(observing that a principal source of opposition to adoption of the original Constitution was
the fear that national powers might be exercised in a manner impairing liberty, thus leading
to a proposed Bill of Rights limiting the poNters of the national government).
11. Leonard W. Levy, "The Bill of Rights," in Constitutional Opinions: Aspects of the Bill
of Rights, ed. Leonard W. Levy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 105, 119-24;
Robert Allen Rutland, James Madison: The Founding Father (New York: Macmillan, 1987),
59-69. Professor Rutland indicates that James Madison had trouble drawing his fellow Fed-
eralists' attention to a Bill of Rights, for they thought other tasks more pressing such as
revenue bills and the judiciary act. Professor Levy is of the opinion that Madison and other
Federalists worked to pass a Bill of Rights, which they thought was unnecessary, to defeat
attempts by Anti-federalists to call a second constitutional convention. The absence of a Bill
of Rights was the primary cause of popular discontent with the new Constitution, thus its
passage all but doomed attempts to have a second convention.
12. Historian Thomas J. Curry offers sage advice concerning the state of mind of those
now revered as the Framers:
Americans in 1789 ... agreed that the federal government had no power in [reli-
gious] matters, but some individuals and groups wanted that fact stated explicitly.
Granted, not all the states would have concurred on a single definition of religious
liberty; but since they were denying power to Congress rather than giving it, differ-
ences among them on that score did not bring them into contention.
... The fact that Congress was not trying to resolve concrete disputes, but merely
strengthening safeguards against possible future adversity, helps explain at least some
of the inattentiveness and absentmindedness attendant upon Americans' enactment
of the First Amendment.
Thomas J. Curry, The First Freedoms: Church and State in America to the Passage of the
First Amendment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 193-94 (footnotes omitted).
13. Twelve articles of amendment were submitted to the states for ratification. The third
of these articles contained the free exercise and no-establishment language. Only the third
through the twelfth articles received the necessary approval by the states, thus the third
article was denominated the "First Amendment." See generally, Levy, note 9, at 85-89 (dis-
cussing ratification debates in the states). The two failed articles of amendment, the first and
second, concerned matters of structure. After languishing more than two centuries, interest
revived in one of the "failed" articles of amendment and it was eventually ratified by the
states in 1992 and is now denominated the Twenty-Seventh Amendment.
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croachments. Moreover, the Bill of Rights as a "negative" on congres-
sional power was not altered when the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified in 1868.14 Nor was this "negative" on power turned into a grant
of new power by the Supreme Court's incorporation of selected provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. 15
A STRUCTURALIST ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
In the hands of the U.S. Supreme Court the Establishment Clause
has not been regarded as a personal right, one that protects against
coercion of religiously informed conscience. Even in archetypal no-
establishment cases such as those concerning religion in public schools,
for example Engel v. Vitale16 and McCollum v. Board of Education,17
the Court applied the Establishment Clause not to relieve individual
students of religious coercion or harm, but to keep two centers of au-
thority-government and religion-in their proper relationship.' 8 This
14. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that Congress does not have the
power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce rights beyond those that the
Supreme Court has said are: (1) protected by one of the clauses in § 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, or (2) found elsewhere and incorporated through the Due Process Clause).
15. Although the Supreme Court's incorporation of the Establishment Clause in Everson
v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), did not grant new power to Congress to "make...
law" concerning religion, incorporation obviously did expand the number of governments
(from just the federal government to the federal government, all the states, and hundreds of
local governmental entities) that were restrained by the clause. Accordingly, it is a truism
that incorporation did newly empower Congress and the federal judiciary to enforce the
"make no law" restraint against state and local governments. To that extent, then, it must be
conceded that incorporation of the Establishment Clause in Everson did vest new power at
the federal level. But this new federal power is one of enforcement only, that is, the new
authority is to police the state and local governments so as to keep them from transgressing
the church-state boundary. The essential point stated in the text still holds: Everson's incor-
poration of the Establishment Clause did not vest new power in government to "make...
law" invading that sphere of competence reserved solely to religion.
16. Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). In Engel, the Supreme Court considered a state
program of daily classroom prayer in the government schools. Students not wanting to par-
ticipate were excused without penalty. Ibid. at 423, n.2. The program was struck down
despite the absence of evidence that religion was being imposed on unwilling students.
Ibid. at 430-31.
17. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948). In McCollum, the Supreme
Court considered a program that permitted persons from the community to come onto the
campus of the government school and conduct elective classes in religion. Student enroll-
ment was optional and required parental permission. Ibid. at 207, n.2. The program was
struck down despite the absence of evidence that religion was being imposed on unwilling
students. Ibid. at 232-33 (Jackson, J., concurring).
18. As the Supreme Court wrote in McCollum, "[Tihe First Amendment rests on the
premise that both religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each
is left free from the other within its respective sphere." Ibid. at 212. In reference to the
Establishment Clause, the Court in Engel said that its "first and most immediate purpose
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is why in popular discourse it is said that the Establishment Clause is
about "church-state relations" or the "separation of church and state."
It is in this structuralist role-when invoked to keep civil government
in the right relationship with religion-that the Establishment Clause
broke with older European patterns 19 and made its most unique
rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government
and to degrade religion." 370 U.S. at 431.
Some will be dismayed at the thought that the Establishment Clause does not have the
immediate object of protecting individual religious rights. But consider Lee v. Welsman,
505 U.S. 577 (1992) (prayer at public school commencement ceremonies), and County of
Allegheny v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (public display of a nativity
scene). Professor McConnell criticized the Court for these decisions because, "[Tihey have
nothing to do with freedom of religion. There is not a single person in these cases who has
been hindered or discouraged by government action from following a religious practice or
way of life." See Michael McConnell, "Freedom from Religion?," American Enterprise
(January/February 1993): 34, 36. Professor McConnell is surely correct in observing that no
one in Weisman or Allegheny had their personal religious rights violated. But he wrongly
assumes that a violation of an individual's religious freedom is requisite to a violation of the
Establishment Clause. The Clause, as applied by the Supreme Court, is about something
altogether different: limiting governmental power so as to keep in appropriate relationship
religion and government. Thus, to understand Weisman and Allegheny, the cases must be
viewed as structural determinations by the Court that government exceeded its power by
involving itself in matters, such as prayer and religious symbolism, beyond its authority.
19. In the stream of Western civilization a structuralist Establishment Clause is the happy
ending to a painful progression. In the early Middle Ages state and church, while organiza-
tionally distinct from one another, were part of a single whole. Man's moral vision derived
from one source, and the state was legitimated by religious sanction. This unity of political
polity and church membership was shattered by the Reformation of the sixteenth century.
The resulting arrangement became state, established church, and religious dissenters. The
latter were often persecuted, in large measure because the presence of dissenters within the
political polity were thought to destabilize the state. Religious wars ensued in a failed at-
tempt to restore the earlier unity. General exhaustion and abhorrence with the violence
wrought by these wars, as well as the emerging influence of the Enlightenment, caused
matters to evolve in the direction of limited state, established church, and toleration of
dissenters. Initially a matter of pragmatism and prudence, toleration was later viewed as a
natural right. See Roland H. Bainton, The Reformation of the Sixteenth Century (Boston,
Mass.: Beacon Press, 1952), 142-44, 211-43; John Neville Figgis, Political Thought from
Gerson to Grotius, 1414-1625 (Cambridge: University Press, 1907), 128-32, 207-10. Such
was the arrangement brought to all the British colonies in America (in variations both strong
and weak) except for Rhode Island. The final turn, uniquely American, occurred state-by-
state during the period of disestablishment, roughly the 1780s to 1830s. The American set-
tlement was a limited state, free churches, and voluntarism in matters of religion and the
exercise thereof. Thus, matters of ecclesiastical cognizance were deregulated, no longer sub-
ject to the state's jurisdiction. The state, however, was not understood as conferring on the
churches their freedom. Rather, the law presupposed and thus was simply acknowledging
the autonomy of churches concerning affairs within the spiritual realm. This settlement was
not, of course, one of state indifference to religion. Although foreswearing any claim to
coercive power, the engagement of churches in public affairs by way of persuasion and
influence continued to be expected and welcomed.
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and celebrated contribution to the American constitutional settle-
ment.20
The Establishment Clause can be a means of redress for individual
harms, but only when the injury is other than religious in nature, such
as economic harm or loss of property,2 1 constraints on academic in-
quiry by teachers and students,22 or restraints on free-thinking athe-
ists.z- Even in these situations, however, the no-establishment
20. Historian Sanford Cobb has observed that America's solution to the "world-old prob-
lem of Church and State" was "so unique, so far-reaching, and so markedly diverse from
European principles as to constitute the most striking contribution of America to the science
of government." Sanford Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty in America (1902, reprint,
New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1968), vii. Republican government, being self-gov-
ernment or popular sovereignty, was believed to require a virtuous and self-disciplined peo-
ple. Because survival of the state depended on civic virtue, government may properly
assume a role in promoting that virtue. However, notithstanding that religion plays a vital
role in training the people in virtuous living, the American constitutional settlement was to
deny to the national government a role in promoting religion. Religion was no longer to be a
tool of statecraft. Michael W. McConnell, "The Origins and Historical Understanding of
Free Exercise of Religion," Harvard Law Review 103 (1990): 1410, 1442-43. Rather, reli-
gion was left to individual choice and voluntarism. Only in this manner, the American inno-
vation had it, could religion remain uncorrupted by government's interference, as well as a
government undivided by sectarian ambitions to wield civil power. Dr. Os Guinness, in his
sociological critique of America and her faiths, put the matter succinctly:
Converging developments ... reveal with ever sharper clarity the audacious gamble
that underlies the American experiment. The American republic simultaneously re-
lies on ultimate beliefs (for otherwise it has no right to the [human] rights by which it
thrives), yet rejects any fixed, final, or official formulation of them (for here the First
Amendment is the clearest, most original, and most constructive). The republic will
therefore always remain the "undecided experiment" in freedom, a gravity-defying
gamble that stands or falls on the dynamism and endurance of its "unofficial" faiths.
Os Guinness, The American Hour: A Time of Reckoning and the Once and Future Role of
Faith (New York: Free Press, 1993), 18-19. See also ibid., 250, "The present state of intellec-
tual division in modem pluralistic societies does not permit agreement at the level of the
origin of beliefs (where justifications of behavior are theoretical, ultimate, and irreconcila-
ble), but a significant, though limited, agreement is still possible at the level of the out-
working of beliefs (where the expression of beliefs in behavior is more practical, less
ultimate and often overlapping with the practical beliefs and behavior of other people).
21. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (upholding claim of depart-
ment store against labor law); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (upholding
claim of tavern seeking issuance of a liquor license); cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420,430-31 (1961) (permitting claim of economic harm by retail stores to be free of Sunday-
closing law, but ultimately ruling against the stores on the merits); Two Guys from Harrison-
Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961) (same).
22. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (striking down a state law that required
teaching of creation in public school science classes if evolution is taught); Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (striking down a state prohibition on teaching evolution in
public school science classes).
23. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). In Torcaso, an atheist who otherwise quali-
fied for a public office refused to take a required oath that professed belief in God. The
Court held the oath requirement violative of the First Amendment without specifying either
religion clause. If an individual objects to the oath out of a religious belief that forbids
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principle is not transformed into an individual-rights clause with the
assigned task of protecting, respectively, property, academic freedom,
and freedom from religion. Rather, these injuries are remedied only
consequentially to the operation of the Establishment Clause as it ful-
fills its structuralist role.2 In such a paradigm the no-establishment
principle orders, even in the absence of individual harm, the respective
competencies of government and religion. Legal historian Mark
DeWolfe Howe concludes:
The First Amendment... would impose a disability upon the national government
to adopt laws with respect to establishments whether or not their consequence
would be to infringe individual rights of conscience.
To find this... purpose in the First Amendment involves, necessarily I think,
the admission that the Amendment is something more than a charter of individual
liberties.25
From time to time religious claimants have sought to enlist the Es-
tablishment Clause into serving as a rights-protecting clause, but the
Supreme Court has rarely followed that course. In Larson v. Valente,26
the Court did apply the no-establishment principle to entertain a claim
involving discrimination among religious groups and thus to redressed
taking oaths, then he has a valid claim under the Free Exercise Clause. As an atheist, hov-
ever, the claimant in Torcaso did not (indeed, by definition could not) suffer a religious
injury as he professed to have no religious beliefs. Nevertheless, for a state to mandate
taking of the oath would be a violation of the Establishment Clause as to all office seekers,
including atheists, because confession of belief in a deity is a subject that remains in the
realm of religion.
Atheists and agnostics are sensibly protected as well by the Free Speech Clause, for the
rights implicated are freedom to believe and freedom to refrain from speaking. Mark
DeWolfe Howe, The Garden and the Wilderness (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1965),
156-57. In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), the Court found violative of
free speech rights a law permitting censorship of films found to be "sacrilegious." The Court
could have reached the same result under the Free Exercise Clause if the film producer
sought to convey a religious belief, either about his own faith or a theological criticism of the
faith of others. However, the Court also could have struck down the censorship law under
the Establishment Clause and done so regardless of whether the film producer sought to
convey a religious or secular message, for a no-establishment transgression does not have as
its object the redress of personal religious injury.
24. The structuralist role in the three cases of Thornton, Edwards, and Torcaso (see notes
21-23), is to restrain government from preferring particular religious practices over secular
concerns in the spheres of, respectively, commerce, science, and qualifications for govern-
ment office. Preferences of this sort, if allowed to multiply without bound, can lead to a
convergence of political factions and religious denominational loyalties. Such a convergence
is bad for peace within the body politic, for in extreme instances such sectarian strife can
breakout into violence and destabilize the state.
25. Mark DeWolfe Howe, "The Constitutional Question," in Religion and the Free Society
(New York: The Fund for the Republic, 1958), 49, 51. See also ibid. at 55.
26. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
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allegations of religious harm.27 But this was highly unusual2 and prob-
ably wrongheaded, for Larson could just as easily-and more sensi-
bly-have been grounded in the Free Exercise Clause.29 Unlike the
Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause protects against per-
sonal religious harm and thus safeguards individual religious rights.
To illustrate, if there had never been an Establishment Clause in
the Bill of Rights, a Larson-type claimant still could have secured relief
from official persecution by filing suit under the Free Exercise Clause.
But numerous other claimants, such as the department store in Estate
of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., the tavern in Larkin v. Grendel's Den,
Inc., and the public school teacher desirous of expanding the science
curriculum in Epperson v. Arkansas, could not have pled successfully a
free exercise claim because they suffered no religious harm.30 These
claimants, absent an Establishment Clause, would not have been able
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
27. In Larson, state charitable solicitation legislation distinguished between religious
groups which received over half their revenues from their membership and those that did
not. The law thereby favored long-founded churches over new religious movements. The
Court held that for government to intentionally discriminate on the basis of religious affilia-
tion is a violation of the Establishment Clause. Ibid. at 244-56. The Court assumed the
complainant was a church subscribing to a bona fide religion. Ibid. at 244, n.16.
28. The only other Supreme Court case utilizing the Establishment Clause as a source of
redress for personal religious injury is Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). In
Gillette, the Court held that exemptions from the military draft for those religiously opposed
to all war but not for those willing to fight in a "just war" was not intentionally discriminatory
on the basis of religious affiliation and thus did not violate the Establishment Clause. Ibid.
at 450-54. Hence, Gillette acknowledged no-establishment as a source of redress for reli-
gious harm caused by religious discrimination but then went on to hold that this particular
claim was without merit. Larson is thus the only Supreme Court case where personal reli-
gious injury was redressed pursuant to the Establishment Clause.
29. It is more sensible to conceptualize a government's intentional discrimination between
two religious groups as injurious to the disfavored religion. If that had been done in Larson,
the Court could have decided the case under the Free Exercise Clause. In order to resolve
Larson under the Establishment Clause, as the Court did, one has to envision the govern-
ment's discrimination as unconstitutional not because it hindered the disfavored religion,
but because the discrimination brought about a preference for competing religions. This
framing of the claimant's injury is conceptually awkward. Official discrimination against a
religion does have the potential of helping other religions, but then again it may turn out to
be of no benefit to the competition. It would be better for the Court to focus on the harm
to the victimized religion rather than to speculate about benefits to competing religions.
The Court did proceed in the more logical fashion suggested here in Church of Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), holding ordinances that ostensibly
regulated the killing of animals but whose real object was to inhibit the practices of a partic-
ular church, were violative of the Free Exercise Clause.
30. See notes 21-24.
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DIFFERENTIATING THE FREE EXERCISE AND
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSES
The literature is often uneven when using the terms "religious free-
dom," "religious liberty," and "religious rights."31 This essay equates all
three, and the terms are used in the sense of an individual constitu-
tional right that protects against personal religious burdens or injuries.
Such a right is secured by the Free Exercise Clause.32 Moreover, the
redressing of a personal harm to an individual's religious belief or prac-
tice is the Free Exercise Clause's only function.33 This makes sense
31. As used in this essay "individual" or "personal rights" includes the "group rights" of a
church or other religious entity where the entity has organizational standing to assert a rights
claim on behalf of its collective membership pursuant to the three-part test set out in Hunt
v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) at 343. See Enin
Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, 2 d ed. (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1994), § 2.3, at pp.
103-04. The common feature of individual rights and group rights is that in both instances
there is no violation of a constitutional right in the absence of a showing of personal "injury
in fact." The violation of a structural clause need not be so attended.
The term "group" is used in the sense of a collection of individuals with a common
cause. When a group (association, institution, organization, society) is imbued with certain
formalities, the government recognizes it as a jural entity. There are no Free Exercise
Clause rights for a religious group over and above the aggregated individual rights of the
entity's membership. However, the Establishment Clause with its role as a limit on govern-
mental power, does afford religious groups institutional autonomy when acting on matters
inherent to religion. See notes 48-52.
Some may be initially dismayed that the Free Exercise Clause does not protect religious
organizations (beyond the aggregated rights of their members) in preserving the group's
autonomy and religious character in the face of governmental intrusion. But, again, as will
be seen below, religious organizations have such safeguards, but the safeguards are secured
by the Establishment Clause. The well-meaning project to force such safeguards into the
scope of the Free Exercise Clause under the banner of "accommodationism" has caused all
manner of doctrinal confusion.
32. The Free Exercise Clause is violated when government enforces a restriction that in-
tentionally discriminates against religion, religious practice, or against an individual because
of his or her religion. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993). However, a law's unintended discriminatory effect adverse to a religious belief or
practice is not, without more, a free exercise violation. Oregon Employment Division v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
A persistent minority of the justices on the Supreme Court indicate that they would go
further and recognize Free Exercise Clause protection for disparate effects on religion.
Compare, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) at 544-65 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(Smith should be reconsidered), with ibid. at 537-44 (Scalia, J., concurring) (defending
Smith decision); see also Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 570-71 (Souter, J., concurring) (Smith should
be reconsidered). There is no need in this essay to take sides in the debate over whether
Smith was correctly decided. Whatever the proper scope of the Free Exercise Clause, the
one certainty is that the injury it redresses is in the nature of personal religious harm and
nothing more.
33. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) at 320 (denying standing to bring free exercise
claim in absence of alleged religious compulsion); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971)
at 689 (rejecting free exercise claim because there was no evidence of impact on claimants'
religious belief or practice); Central Bd. of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) at 249
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because the clause is, by its terms, about "prohibiting the free exercise
[of religion]" rather than the exercise of nonbelief. As Professor John
Garvey notes:
[Any other] conclusion is hard to square with the language of the first amendment,
which protects only the free exercise "of religion." Rejecting religion is an exercise
of freedlom, but it is not an exercise of religion. (Amputation is not a way of exer-
cising my foot).-'
The Free Exercise Clause says nothing about other injuries such as
protecting against encumbrances on the use of one's property (Thorn-
ton) or removing hindrances to academic inquiry (Epperson). Nor
does the clause prohibit the forced taking of religious oaths by
freethinking atheists (Torcaso). The latter is true because to suffer a
personal religious harm an individual must first profess a religion. It
follows that the Free Exercise Clause is not an all-purpose conscience
clause. 35 It protects religiously informed belief and practice, nothing
more. People can incur injuries other than religious harms, as in eco-
nomic harm, loss of academic freedom, or compulsion to profess a reli-
gious belief when they are agnostic or atheistic. These are individual
(holding that free exercise claim is without merit in absence of religious burden); Abington
School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) at 221, 223 (holding that in a free exercise
claim it is necessary to show governmental coercion on the practice of religion); ibid. at 224.
("[T]he requirements for standing to challenge state action under the Establishment Clause,
unlike those relating to the Free Exercise Clause, do not include proof that particular reli-
gious freedoms are infringed."); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) at 431 (stating that the
Establishment Clause goes much further than to relieve coercive pressure on religious belief
and practice); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) at 429 (denying standing to
plead free exercise claim when alleged damages were economic rather than religious).
Some may object because this reading of the religion clauses leaves too little work for
the Free Exercise Clause. I have two responses. First, the work of preventing intentional
discrimination on the basis of religion is important work indeed. Second, if the reader still
believes there is too little scope for this venerable clause, then that is the undoing of the
Supreme Court in the controversial Smith decision.
34. See John H. Garvey, "An Anti-Liberal Argument for Religious Freedom," Journal of
Contemporanj Legal Issues 7 (1996): 275.
35. See Frazee v. Illinois Department of Empl. Security, 489 U.S. 829 (1989) at 833 (not-
ing that only beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause; secular
views will not suffice); Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981) at 713-14 (noting that
only beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) at 215-16 (identifying claims that are "personal and philosophi-
cal" and those "merely a matter of personal preference" as "not ris[ing] to the demands of
the Religion Clauses"). See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (plurality opinion)
(deciding that conscientious objector status as conferred by federal legislation did not re-
quire individuals claiming draft deferment to hold beliefs based on traditional religious
views). Welsh is not contrary to the principle set forth in the text. First, Welsh involved the
definition of religion for purposes of legislation rather than for the religion clauses of the
First Amendment. Second, because there was no majority opinion, Welsh is binding only on
the narrow issue decided. Third, the Welsh plurality has been rejected, sub silento, by later
majorities in Frazee, Thomas, and Yoder.
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harms, to be sure, but not religious harms.36 Religious harms are left to
be remedied, if at all, as a by-product of the Establishment Clause
keeping aright the spheres of government and religion.
This is not to say that the Establishment Clause has nothing to do
with religious liberty writ large, a matter taken up later in this essay.
Structural clauses, as noted previously, do indirectly bear on the pro-
tection of individual rights, including religious rights. By delimiting
and qualifying governmental sovereignty, structure often redounds to
further secure personal rights. Conversely, although rights clauses
have as their immediate purpose the protection of individual freedom,
they have a consequential impact on governmental power. But this
happy symmetry between structure and rights is no reason to conflate
them.37 The object of a structural clause is to set compensating checks
on the powers of a modern nation-state, checks that must be honored
whether or not individual complainants suffer concrete "injury in
fact."m3 Because the Establishment Clause is a structural clause rather
36. When the religious harm is to speech of religious content or to religious viewpoint, it
has long been the practice of the Court to protect the free exercise of religion under the
Free Speech and Free Press Clauses. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)
(striking down restrictions on student religious groups wanting to meet in state university
buildings designated as limited public fora as violating of the Free Speech Clause); Lovell v.
City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (overturning ordinance prohibiting distribution of liter-
ature of any kind as abridging right of Jehovah's Witnesses to freedom of the press); West
Virginia State Board of Education o. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that compulsory
flag salute at public school denies freedom of speech and freedom of belief as applied toJehovah's Witnesses). By subsuming where possible protection from religious harm under
the Free Speech and Free Press clauses, the Court has given religious rights a broader and
hence more secure base.
The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses are unable, of course, to protect religious
activity that has no appreciable expressional content. Concerning such activity, the Free
Exercise Clause alone must be looked to as the source of constitutional protection from
personal religious injury. Justice White, dissenting in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333
(1970) (plurality opinion), stated the matter well:
It cannot be ignored that the First Amendment itself contains a religious classifica-
tion. The Amendment protects belief and speech, but as a general proposition, the
free speech provisions stop short of immunizing conduct from official regulation.
The Free Exercise Clause, however, has a deeper cut: it protects conduct as well as
religious belief and speech.
Ibid. at 372.
37. See Akhil Reed Amar, 'The Bill of Rights as a Constitution," Yale Law Journal 100
(1991): 1131. Professor Amar argues that constitutional rights also impose an organizational
structure on government. Ibid. at 1132-33. The point in this essay, however, is that the
structuring of government that comes from the enforcement of a rights clause is not the
immediate object of the clause but derivative of it. Conversely, the protection of individual
rights that comes from the enforcement of a structural clause is not the immediate object of
the clause but derivative of it. Hence, the immediate object of enforcement of the Estab-
lishment Clause is not religious freedom, but religious freedom is derivative of it.
38. This is why federal taxpayers, without any shoving of personal "injury in fact," are
sometimes granted special standing to pursue Establishment Clause claims challenging
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than a rights clause, it is vital that it be understood as such and be so
applied.
THE CLAUSES-IN-CONFLIc'T FALLAcY
In the hands of the Supreme Court, then, the task of the Establish-
ment Clause is independent of the Free Exercise Clause's protection of
individual religious rights. Neither clause is subordinate or instrumen-
tal to the other.39 Nor is there "tension" between the clauses, as if they
sometimes pulled in opposite directions leaving it to the courts to "bal-
ance" one against the other and thereby having to choose between
them. The clauses-in-conflict contention makes no sense.40 It is
neither consistent with the First Amendment's text (neither clause
spending programs. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (granting taxpayer stand-
ing); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (denying
taxpayer standing); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (granting taxpayer standing);
Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952) (denying taxpayer standing).
39. Grammatically there is but one First Amendment clause (with two prepositional
phrases) that explicitly concerns religion. The existence of a single Clause has been turned
into an argument that one religion clause has but one purpose, and that purpose is the
protection of individual religious freedom. Thus, it is argued, the no-establishment of reli-
gion is but a means to serve the free exercise of religion. The consequence, should the
argument prevail, is that the rule of no-establishment becomes a tool in aid of free exercise.
See Richard John Neuhaus, "Proposing Democracy Anew-Part One," First Things 96
(1999): 87, 90; Richard John Neuhaus, "The Most New Thing in the Novus Ordo
Seculorum," First Things 85 (1998): 75-78; and Richard John Neuhaus, "Establishment Is
Not The Issue," The Religion and Society Report (June 1987): 4; [hereinafter "Neuhaus, Not
The Issue"].
The claim that no-establishment does not operate separate and independent of free ex-
ercise leads not only to confusion, but-as implied in the text-has dire consequences for
the law. The argument's adoption would lead not just to conflation of an individual right
vith a structural restraint, but to destruction of the structuralist meaning of no-establish-
ment. Notwithstanding the grammatical correction, the single religion clause consists of two
prepositional phrases. Historically each prepositional phrase carried its own operative
meaning, for both the Senate and House in the First Congress debated and amended the
text of the first Clause of the First Amendment as having two independent phrases. See
Walter Berns, "Religion and the Founding Principle," in The Moral Foundations of the
American Republic, 3" ed. (Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 1986), 204,
206-10 (making the point that freedom of conscience as embodied in the Free Exercise
Clause was not opposed by anyone, but the ideas embodied in the Establishment Clause
divided Congress over the role, if any, government had in fostering religion and, if there was
a role, whether that role was entirely at the state level).
40. A casebook widely used in law schools supplies an all too common example of the
"tension" argument:
The two clauses.., protect overlapping values, but they often exert conflicting pres-
sures. Consider the common practice of exempting church property from taxation.
Does the benefit conveyed by government to religion via that exemption constitute
an "establishment"? Would the "free exercise" of religion be unduly burdened if
church property were not exempted from taxation? Articulating satisfactory criteria
to accommodate the sometimes conflicting emanations of the two religion clauses is
a recurrent challenge in this chapter.
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states it has primacy over the other)41 nor are such conflicts inherent to
the religion clauses and thereby logically unavoidable.42 Conflict is not
possible, for each clause in its own way was a "negative" on powers that
might have been implied from the original Constitution. Two "nega-
tives" cannot conflict. The religious rights of individuals and the order-
ing of relations between government and religion -while
complementary, not contradictory-are altogether different
enterprises.
A RESTRAINT ON GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNMENT ALONE
Proper relations between religion and government (or "church and
state") are codified in the text "make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion." This limitation casts the Establishment Clause in the
role of boundary keeper. In setting out to locate that boundary, it is a
useful reminder that the "keeper's" task is to restrain government, not
private individuals, not churches, and not religion. Thus the role of the
no-establishment principle is not to protect people from other people.
Nor is it to protect minority religions from majority religions. Nor is it
to protect the nonreligious from the religious. Nor is it to protect the
government from the churches. The Establishment Clause's sole ob-
ject is to limit government, including, of course, to restrain government
when it improperly allies with religion. Richard John Neuhaus writes:
The religion clause of the First Amendment is entirely a check upon government,
not a check upon religion. Even if a particular religion were to agitate successfully
to have itself officially established, it is the government that would have to do the
establishing. And that is what the government is forbidden to do. As wrong-
headed as it would be, religions are perfectly free to agitate to have themselves
established, for that too is part of religious freedom. What is prohibited by the
First Amendment is the [use] of government power in giving in to such agita-
tions.... The religion clause is not then, as some claim, a check upon both
government and religion, nor is it a provision in which two clauses are to be "bal-
Kathleen M. Sullivan and Gerald Gunther, First Amendment Law (New York: Foundation
Press, 1999), 459.
41. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464 (1982) at 484.
("We know of no principled basis on which to create a hierarchy of constitutional values or a
complementary 'sliding scale' of standing which might permit [plaintiffs] to invoke the judi-
cial power of the United States.")
42. Some academics still think that the "tension" between the Free Exercise and Estab-
lishment Clauses is inherent and irreconcilable. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, "Lee v. Wetsnan:
Paradox Redux," Supreme Court Review (1992): 123, 123-25, 129-30. However, when a
claimed "freedom from religion" is removed from the religion clauses as a constitutionally
protected right, the supposed "tension" falls away. Such a move does not leave a claimed
"freedom from religion" without constitutional protection. It does mean, however, that to
the extent that the First Amendment does protect a "freedom from religion," it does so as a
by-product of the structural restraint on governmental power found in the Establishment
Clause.
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anced" against one another. The religion clause is not to protect the state from the
church but to protect the church from the state. Similarly, in press-state relations,
the First Amendment is not to protect the state from the press but to protect the
press from the state. The "great object" of the Bill of Rights, [James] Madison
most explicitly said when introducing his draft to the House [of Representatives],
was to 'limit and qualify the powers of Government."43
Secular modernists are prone to assume that religious ideologies
are more intolerant and violent than secular ideologies. Thus they as-
sume that the Establishment Clause is there to protect them from the
excesses of religion. But the Clause can protect them only from the
excesses of government.
LOCATING THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT
During America's founding period, the Establishment Clause der-
egulated matters concerning religious belief and practice. Commenting
on the Founders' attitudes, Historian Jack Rakove writes:
[James] Madison and [Thomas] Jefferson were not mere tolerationists; they coun-
tenanced a constitutional solution to the religion question, renouncing the author-
ity of the state to regulate the one aspect ofbehavior that had most disrupted the
peace of society since the Reformation. For at the heart of their support or dises-
tablishment and free exercise lay the radical conviction that nearly the entire
sphere of religious practice could be safely deregulated, placed beyond the cogni-
zance of the state, and thus defused as hoth a source of political strife and a danger
to individual rights.44
What still remains in play is not so much the task of maintaining a
double-sided "wall of separation," as it is answering the question of
where the boundary between government and religion lies and, hence,
what individuals and religious groups may do on the sacerdotal side of
this boundary free from government's interference with-as well as
freedom from government's misplaced attempts to boost-religion.
The task thereby resolves itself down to a question of jurisdiction. As
Professor Max L. Stackhouse aptly concludes:
[The First] amendment to the Constitution acknowledges the existence of an
arena of discourse, activity, commitment, and organization for the ordering of life
over which the state has no authority. It is a remarkable thing in human history
when the authority governing coercive power limits itself.... However much
government may become involved in regulating various aspects of economic, tech-
nological. medical, cultural, educational, and even sexual behaviors in society, reli-
gion is an arena that, when it is doing its own thing, is off limits. This is not only
an affirmation of the freedom of individual belief or practice, not only an acknowl-
edgment that the state is noncompetent when it comes to theology, it is the recog-
nition of a sacred domain that no secular authority can fully control. Practically,
43. Neuhaus, "Establishment is Not The Issue," 3.
44. Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitu-
tion (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), 311-12.
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this means that at least one association may be brought into being in society that
has a sovereignty beyond the control of government 4 5
When government acts in excess of the Establishment Clause, religion
may be helped or hindered. But any such act, whether it ends up help-
ing or hindering religion, is a transgression of the clause.
Identification of the precise subject matters that fall within the
meaning of the restraint on "making ... law respecting an establish-
ment of religion" necessarily entails substantive choices. The boundary
has been disputed for over two thousand years,46 so it would be naive to
suppose that there is an easy formula for determining "what is Caesar's
and what is God's." From the perspective of an elder statesman after a
full life of public service, James Madison said, "I must admit moreover
that it may not be easy, in every possible case, to trace the line of sepa-
ration between the rights of religion and the Civil authority with such
distinctness as to avoid collision & doubts on unessential points."47
On the other hand, the difficulty should not be exaggerated. The
differences are often, as Madison said, on "unessential points." In the
vast number of cases, a ready reference to the historic Western tradi-
tion as received on this side of the Atlantic and later altered here will
yield a ready solution. It is the hard cases, of course, that get most of
the attention (e.g., aid to K-12 religious schools), thereby leaving the
impression that the overall task of boundary keeping is hopelessly con-
flicted. But the very fact that Americans are endlessly struggling over
the location of the boundary actually confirms one of the central points
of this essay-namely, nearly everyone presumes that there are two
spheres of competency and, hence, a sphere of religious autonomy
where the state has no juridical cognizance.
45. Max L. Stackhouse, "Religion, Rights, and the Constitution," in An Unsettled Arena:
Religion and the Bill of Rights, eds. Ronald C. White, Jr. & Albright G. Zimmerman (Grand
Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1990), 92, 111.
46. Professor Duesenberg has observed:
Civil church law is in essence a study of the relationship between competing powers.
... The word competition is chosen to denote the active interplay between church
government and civil government which flows from the indecision existing within
and between them as to the proper scope of their respective domains. There is not
now nor has there ever been in the two thousand year history of the Christian church
common agreement over where to draw the line.
Richard W. Duesenberg, "Jurisdiction Of Civil Courts Over Religious Issues," Ohio State
Law Journal 20 (1959): 508.
47. Letter from James Madison to the Reverend Adams (1832), in The Writings of James
Madison, ed. Gaillard Hunt (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1910), IX: 484, 487. See also
McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) at 237-38 (Jackson, J., concurring)
("The task of separating the secular from the religious in education is one of magnitude,
intricacy and delicacy... It is idle to pretend that this task is one from which we can find
in the Constitution one word to help us as judges to decide where the secular ends and the
sectarian begins in education.")
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The Supreme Court has not left the lower courts, legislators, and
litigants without guidance on the all-important question of boundary
keeping. The cases indicate that government does not exceed the re-
straints of the Establishment Clause unless it is acting on topics that
are inherently religious. The Supreme Court has found that prayer,48
devotional Bible reading,49 veneration of the Ten Commandments, °
classes in confessional religion,51 and the biblical story of crea-
tion taught as science52 are all inherently (or "exclusively") reli-
gious. Hence, by virtue of the Establishment Clause, these topics are
off limits as objects of legislation or any other purposeful action
by civil officials. Likewise, when government is called on to
resolve doctrinal questions, or related matters bearing on ecclesias-
tical polity, clerical office, or church discipline and membership,
these subject matters are outside the cognizance of government.5 3
Finally, the Court has acknowledged as beyond the competence
of government those issues involving the religious meaning of
religious words, practices, and events,4 as well as questions concern-
48. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Abington
School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
49. Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
50. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
51. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
52. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
53. Concerning matters that touch on doctrine, disputes over doctrine, ecclesiastical polity,
the selection or promotion of clerics, and dismissal from church membership, the Supreme
Court has said that civil courts are without subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Serbian E.
Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) at 708-24 (stating that civil courts
may not probe into church polity); Maryland & Va. Churches of God v. Church at Sharps-
burg, 396 U.S. 367 (1970) at 368 (per curian) (urging the avoidance of doctrinal disputes);
Presbyterian Church v. Hull Mem'l Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969) at 451 (holding that civil
courts are forbidden to interpret and weigh church doctrine); Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathe-
dral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960) at 191 (per curiam) (holding that the First Amendment prevents
judiciary, as well as legislature, from interfering in ecclesiastical governance of Russian Or-
thodox Church); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952) at 119 (holding that
the First Amendment prevents legislature from interfering in ecclesiastical governance of
Russian Orthodox Church); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (15 Wall.) 679 (1872) at 725-33 (re-
jecting implied trust rule because of its departure-from-doctrine inquiry). Cases dismissing
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction do not reference Article III of the Constitution, for
there is nothing in Article III that limits federal court jurisdiction concerning these matters.
Rather, the cases reference the First Amendment and the necessity to keep a proper separa-
tion of church and state.
54. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) at 844-45 (cautioning state
university to avoid distinguishing between evangelism, on the one hand, and the expression
of ideas merely approved by a given religion); Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327 (1987) at 336 (recognizing a problem when government attempts to divine which
ecclesiastical appointments are sufficiently related to the "core" of a religious organization to
merit exemption from statutory duties); ibid. at 344-45 (Brennan, J., concurring) (same);
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) at 604, n.30 (avoiding potentially
entangling inquiry by courts into religious practice is desirable); Widmar v. Vincent, 454
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ing the centrality of a particular belief or practice to a given
religion. 5
Closely related to these case-by-case designations of what is inher-
ently religious and what is "arguably non-religious,"56 is the rule that
U.S. 263 (1981) at 269-70 n.6, 272 n.11 (holding that inquiries into significance of religious
words or events are to be avoided); Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) at 674
(holding that it is desirable to avoid entanglement that would follow should tax authorities
evaluate the temporal worth of religious social welfare programs); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940) at 305-07 (stating that petty officials are not to be given discretion to
determine what is a legitimate "religion" for purposes of issuing a permit); see also Epinosa
v. Rusk, 456 U.S. 951 (1982) (affd mem.) (striking down charitable solicitation ordinance
that required officials to distinguish between "spiritual" and secular purposes underlying
solicitation by religious organizations); United States v. Christian Echoes Ministry, 404 U.S.
561 (1972) at 564-65 (per curiam) (holding that IRS could not appeal directly to Supreme
Court the ruling of a federal district court to the effect that the IRS's redetermination of
§ 501(c)(3) exempt status was done in a manner violative of rights of an admittedly religious
organization; district court had prevented IRS from examining all of religious organization's
activities and characterizing them as either "religious" or "political" and, if political, then
"non-religious").
55. Oregon Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) at 886-87 ('judging the
centrality of different religious practices is akin to the unacceptable business of evaluating
the relative merits of differing religious claims."); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetenj Pro-
tective Association, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) at 449-51, 457-58 (rejecting Free Exercise Clause
test that "depend[s] on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objec-
tor's spiritual development"); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) at 257 (rejecting
government's argument that free exercise claim does not lie unless "payment of social secur-
ity taxes will... threaten the integrity of the Amish religious belief or observance"). The
rule stated in the text was recently reaffirmed in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997) at 513, as explaining, inter alia, the decision in Smith. The compelling-interest test,
abandoned in Smith, was thought to require a judge to weigh the importance of a religious
practice against a state's interest in applying a neutral law without any exceptions.
The Supreme Court has similarly held that legislative classifications based on denomina-
tional affiliation are not permitted. See Kiryas Joel Board of Education v. Grumet, 512 U.S.
687 (1994) at 702-08; Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) at 448-51; see Larson v.
Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) at 246 n.23 (distinguishing and explaining Gillette). The Court
wants to avoid making church membership of legal significance for two reasons. First,
membership, as well as denial of or removal from membership, are inherently religious
decisions. Second, if this was not the rule of law, then merely holding religious membership
could result in a civic advantage. For example, if Congress were to confer conscientious
objector draft status "on all Quakers," that may induce conversions (real or pseudo) to Quak-
erism. On the other hand, the government purposefully may utilize classifications based on
a person's religious belief or practice-as distinct from denominational affiliation-to lift
civil burdens from those individuals. For example, Congress may confer conscientious ob-
jector draft status "on religious pacifists who oppose war in any form." See Gillette, 401 U.S.
at 448-60; Grumet, 512 U.S. at 715-16 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment). This is consistent with the rule that government can either treat all alike, not
concerning itself with unintended effects, or government can purposefully lift civic burdens
from individuals based on their religious practices. What is impermissible is to lift such
burdens based on an individual's denominational or religious affiliation.
56. As one commentator put it, albeit in the context of discussing a different but related
problem, some topics of legislation can be described as "arguably religious" for free exercise
purposes but "arguably non-religious" for no-establishment purposes. See Tribe, American
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the Establishment Clause is not violated when a governmental restric-
tion (or social welfare program) merely reflects a moral judgment,
shared by some religions, about conduct thought harmful (or benefi-
cial) to society.57 Accordingly, overlap between a law's purpose and the
moral teachings of a variety of well-known religions does not, without
more, render the law one "respecting an establishment of religion."
Sunday-closing laws,53 teenage sexual abstinence counseling,59 the
availability of abortion,60 and interracial dating,61 and civil marriage 62
are subject matters that the Court has deemed not inherently reli-
gious.63 Hence, so far as the Establishment Clause is concerned, these
are appropriate topics for legislation or other action by government.
Wrestling with the issue of how to sort out moral-based legislation, per-
mitted by the Establishment Clause, from legislation on an inherently
religious matter, which is not permitted, Clifford R. Goldstein writes:
[T]o believe not only that moral absolutes exist, but that we can know what those
absolutes are, isn't synonymous with the assumption that government should en-
force them .... Yet an open society's stance that any truth, or even The Truth,
shouldn't oppress opposing "truth" or even untruth doesn't mean that it should act
as if there is no truth. Law, implicitly or explicitly, implies morality, which reflects
various concepts of "truth."... But can this be done without breaching the wall
of separation? That all depends, of course, on how high and impregnable that wall
is. A wall that separates church and state is fine; one that separates morality from
law isn't. When, in the name of separation, a school protects a child from govern-
Constitutional Law, 1' ed., § 14-6, at 828-33 (arguing that subject matters "arguably non-
religious" are not prohibited by the Establishment Clause as topics of legislation).
57. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) at 604 n.8, 613 (counseling of teenagers con-
cerning sexuality is not inherently religious); Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S.
at 604 n.30 (1983) (tax regulation prohibiting racial discrimination in education is not inher-
ently religious); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) at 319-20 (a restriction on abortion
not inherently religious); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) at 431-49 (Sunday-
closing law is not inherently religious); Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGin-
ley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961) at 592-98 (same); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., 366 U.S.
617 (1961) at 624-30 (same); Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299 (1896) at 306-07 (prohi-
bition on Sunday operation of trains is not inherently religious).
58. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding Sunday-closing legislation as a
mere labor law); Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961)
(same).
59. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (upholding federal funding program for cen-
ters counseling teenagers concerning sexuality, including faith-based centers).
60. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding a federal restriction on the funding
of elective abortions).
61. Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. at 604 n.30 (1983) (disapproving of a
university's rule against interracial dating).
62. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) at 162-67 (upholding antipolygamy law
regulating the civil law of marriage).
63. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Although not referencing the Estab-
lishment Clause, it is implicit in Bowers that the Court did not consider the regulation of
intimate sexual relations inherently religious.
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ment-sponsored religious exercises, it's defending the [wall] .... [O]n the other
hand, when, in the name of separation, a school teaches condom use instead of
abstinence, it's violating principles of that same moral universe.64
The constitutionality of legislation exempting religion from regulatory
burdens and taxation6 also make sense from the perspective of a struc-
turalist Establishment Clause, for these exemptions enhance and rein-
force the desired separation of church and state.
The Supreme Court has successfully avoided two mistakes when
drawing the boundary between government and religion. First, the
Court has not identified churches and other religious organizations
(e.g., educational, charitable, and mission societies) and then assumed
that religion is actually confined to those institutions. Churches and
their affiliated ministries do not monopolize religion. Religiously
grounded convictions and obligations show their influence in every
area of life, not merely in church affairs. Hence, Establishment Clause
violations can occur notwithstanding the complete absence of involve-
ment by churches, mission societies, religious schools, and the like.66
Second, the Supreme Court has not set out to separate government
from all that could be said to be religious. Rather, the separation is of
government from matters inherently religious. A separation of govern-
ment from all that is religion or religious would result in a secular pub-
lic square, one hostile to the public face of religion. The Founders
intended no such regime. Historian Mark A. Noll writes:
[T]he founders' desire for the separation of the institutions of church and state
reflected a desire to respect not only religion but also the moral choice of citizens.
It was not a provision to remove religion as such from public life. In the context of
the times it was more a device for purifying the religious impact on politics than
removing it.
The authors of the [Constitution] seemed to be saying that religion and politics
occupied two different "spheres." This was not secular in the modem sense.
[T]here was every expectation that Christian principles would continue to play a
large role in strengthening the population and even in providing a moral context
64. Clifford R. Goldstein, "Getting Reality Right," Liberty 92 (May/June 1997): 30-31.
65. See, e.g., Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding
religious exemption in an employment nondiscrimination law); Walz v. Tax Commission, 397
U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding property tax exemption for houses of worship). The aberrational
case is Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. California Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990)
at 392-97, holding that the Establishment Clause is not violated by a state sales tax on the
sale of religious material assessed against an evangelistic ministry.
66. See, e.g., Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (striking down state
labor law that guaranteed private sector employees right not to work on Sabbath); Stone v.
Graham, 449 U.S. 297 (1980) (per curiam) (disallowing posting of Ten Commandments in
public school classrooms for veneration); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (striking
down state law prohibiting the teaching of evolution in public schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962) (disallowing state program of classroom prayer in public school).
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for legislation. Yet the Constitution, without ever spelling it out precisely, none-
theless still acknowledges that the functions of government in society have a differ-
ent role than the functions of religion. Both are important, and important to each
other. But they are different. 67
There are extreme voices claiming for the Establishment Clause the
ordaining of a new secular order,6s one that would thereby cabin reli-
gion in the "private" spaces of home and chapel.69 Still others lament
that the Court has promulgated a right to a freedom from religion.70
But the cases will not bear either of these readings.
Various justices of the Supreme Court, in short but helpful state-
ments, have sought to encapsulate a definition of the boundary be-
tween government and the inherently religious. Justice William
Brennan wrote that the common thread in the, Court's analysis of
whether legislation transgresses the Establishment Clause restraint "is
whether the statutes involve government in the 'essentially religious
activities' of religious institutions."71 Just a few years earlier, Justice
John M. Harlan said "that where the contested governmental activity is
calculated to achieve nonreligious purposes otherwise within the com-
petence of the State, and where the activity does not involve the State
so significantly and directly in the realm of the sectarian,"72 then the
constitutional restraint is not exceeded. As a final example, Justice Fe-
67. Mark A. Noll, One Nation Under God? Christian Faith and Political Action in America
(San Francisco, Calif.: Harper & Row, 1988), 67-69.
68. See Suzanna Sherry, "Enlightening the Religion Clauses," Journal Contemp. Legal Is-
sues 7 (1996): 473, 483-89 (arguing that secular rationalism is constitutionally preferred
over religion); Kathleen M. Sullivan, "Religion and Liberal Democracy," University of Chi-
cago Law Review 59 (1992): 195, 197-214, 222 (contending that the First Amendment's
negative bar against an establishment of religion implies an affirmative establishment of a
secular public order). The multicentury tradition of American politics being rooted in con-
trasting theological persuasions is so well documented as to make silly revisionists' claims
that the Establishment Clause rendered religion of persuasive force only in the "privacy" of
home and church. See, e.g., James L. Guth, et al., The Bully Pulpit: The Politics of Protes-
tant Clergy (Lawrence, Kans.: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1997).
69. "[There are those] devoted to promoting secularism as a kind of antireligion for every-
one. Such individuals or organizations-for example, the aptly named Freedom from Reli-
gion Foundation-are as militant in their convictions and as sure of their truth as religious
fundamentalists. But for more skeptical secularists, pragmatic adjustment to reality in one's
environment in an atmosphere of tolerance is what makes sense .. " Robert Booth
Fowler, "A Skeptical Postmodern Defense of Multiestablishment: The Case for Govern-
ment Aid to Religious Schools in a Multicultural Age," in Everson Revisited: Religion, Edu-
cation, and Law at the Crossroads, eds. Jo Ren~e Formicola & Hubert Morken (Lanham,
Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), 167, 171.
70. See McConnell, "Freedom from Religion," 36.
71. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) at 658 (Brennan, J., concurring).
72. Central Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) at 249 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring) (internal quotation omitted).
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lix Frankfurter sketched the no-establishment boundary in structuralist
terms with these words:
The Establishment Clause withdrew from the sphere of legitimate legislative con-
cern and competence a specific, but comprehensive, area of human conduct:
man's belief or disbelief in the verity of some transcendental idea and man's ex-
pression in action of that belief or disbelief. Congress may not make these mat-
ters, as such, the subject of legislation, nor, now, may any legislature in this
country.73
Each of these formulations will do, for they point to the same basic
distinction between subject matters that are inherently religious and
subjects that-while arguably religious-are grounded in the morals,
traditions, or cultural values of the political community and hence ex-
plained in those terms. This approach, of course, unapologetically
draws upon the historic Western tradition as received in the American
colonies and later altered during the period of state-by-state disestab-
lishment, roughly the 1780s to the 1830s.
"Inherently religious," then, means those exclusively religious activ-
ities of worship and the propagation or inculcation of the sort of tenets
that comprise confessional statements or creeds common to many reli-
gions. The term includes, as well, the supernatural claims emanating
from churches, mosques, synagogues, temples, and other centers of
worship, using those words not to identify buildings, but to describe
the faith community around which a religion identifies and defines it-
self, conducts its collective worship, divines and teaches doctrine, and
propagates the faith to children and adult converts. A structuralist Es-
tablishment Clause places these matters-being in the exclusive prov-
ince of religion-beyond the government's jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
This essay does not claim that the United States Supreme Court has
resolved all of the problems in defining the boundary between religion
and government by relegating the Establishment Clause restraint to
73. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) at 465-66 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in
the judgment). See also ibid. at 465 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("The purpose of the
Establishment Clause was to assure that the national legislature would not exert its power in
the service of any purely religious end; that it would not, as Virginia and virtually all of tie
Colonies had done, make of religion, as religion, an object of legislation."); Abington School
District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) at 306 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (Observing that
"the Court would recognize the propriety... of the teaching about religion, as distinguished
from the teaching of religion, in the public schools."); Douglas Laycock, "The Benefits of the
Establishment Clause," DePaul Law Review 42 (1992): 373, 381 ("What the Establishment
Clause separates from government is theology, worship, and ritual, the aspects of religion
that relate only to things outside the jurisdiction of government. Questions of morality, of
right conduct, of proper treatment of our fellow humans, are questions to which both
church and state have historically spoken.")
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governmental acts on matters inherently religious. There will always
be boundary disputes because the task of determining what is "inher-
ently religious" generates tension between the Western tradition and
the deeply held beliefs (religious and secular) of others. It suffices
here to candidly acknowledge that a structuralist Establishment Clause
is not substantively neutral.74 Indeed, substantive neutrality is impossi-
ble because every theory of government-religion relations necessarily
takes a position on the nature and value of organized religion and on
the purpose and direction of the modern nation-state.
The first line of defense for the Supreme Court's position is that
the Constitution's church-state boundary is the disestablishment settle-
ment of the early nationhood period. As such, it is not to be tampered
with under the guise of needed updating of "our living Constitution."
In the end, however, if the Court's government-religion boundary is to
have staying power it has to be defended not because it is originalist or
noncontroversial, but because it is good. Indeed, it is a three-fold
good: it maximizes individual religious choice, protects the integrity of
religion and religious organizations, and minimizes government-in-
duced religious factionalism within the body politic.75 In a representa-
74. The structuralist settlement is a formal legal rule, but it is not substantively neutral. If
it is objective law-making that is desired, the best a legal system can do is to pick a formal
legal rule and then rigorously and dispassionately apply it without regard to the winners and
losers in any fact-specific case that should later come before a judge. Such formal rules
provide clarity and reduce judicial subjectivity. But the initial choice of a particular formal
rule, necessarily rejecting competing rules, is a value-laden judgment that is in no sense
substantively neutral. At bottom all claims of neutrality are a mask. See Garvey, "An Anti-
Liberal Argument," 290-91 (liberalism is not neutral, but makes "assumptions about human
nature (the unencumbered self, the value of authenticity) that are inconsistent with convic-
tions that many religious people hold"); Steven D. Smith, Foreordained Failure: The Quest
for a Constitutional Principle of Religious Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press,
1995), 68 ("A different religion or a secular viewpoint will support different background
beliefs that logically generate different views or theories of religious freedom.").
75. The Supreme Court's most complete explication of the twin purposes underlying the
Establishment Clause is found in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431-33 (1962) (stating the
purposes as protection of religion from the corrupting hand of government and protection of
government from being destroyed by sectarian strife). See also Ira C. Lupu, "To Control
Faction and Protect Liberty: A General Theory of the Religion Clauses,"Journal of Contem-
poranj Legal Issues 7 (1996): 357. In a representative democracy there will always be fac-
tionalism along political lines. This is to be expected. But it is not desirable when religious
denominations and political factionalism become one and the same. To the extent that gov-
ernment actions cause political factionalism and religious denominations (or similar creedal
differences) to converge, such actions are of heightened concern to the Establishment
Clause. This concern for avoidance of sectarian strife within the body politic was articulated
in McGowan v. Manland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) at 430, in that "the establishment of a reli-
gion was equally feared because of its tendencies to political tyranny and subversion of civil
authority."
By denying governmental jurisdiction over inherently religious matters, the Establish-
ment Clause has the object of protecting religious liberty writ large, i.e., the twin purposes
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five democracy, there will always be factionalism along political lines.
It is not desirable, however, when religious denominations and political
factions become one and the same, To the extent that governmental
actions cause political factions and religious differences to converge,
such actions are of heightened concern to the Establishment Clause.
Thus, the Supreme Court, in Engel v. Vitale, made clear that the twin
purposes of the Establishment Clause are to protect religion from the
corrupting hand of government and to protect the government from
being torn apart by sectarian strife.76
Under the constitutional settlement, the Establishment Clause is
not a silver bullet for winning (or ending) the culture wars.77 Although
the government-religion boundary-policed by the no-establishment
principle--keeps government from taking sides on confessional and
other inherently religious matters, moral and ethical questions have al-
ways been proper objects of legislation. Whose morality will dominate
the Republic at any point in time, and hence will be reflected in the
positive law of the nation, is not predetermined by the Establishment
Clause. That determination is left for the making based on who has the
more persuasive argument in the marketplace of ideas, as well as the
organizational acumen to promote it.
of the Establishment Clause. Thus, the no-establishment principle is not an individual right
from governmental intrusion, but a polity-wide liberty (the blessings of which favor the
entire body politic) to a government that may not intermeddle in inherently religious mat-
ters. This fundamental difference between the individual freedom that derives from a con-
stitutional right and the polity-wide liberty that derives from constitutional structure was
noted by Justice Kennedy in the recent line item veto case:
So convinced were the Framers that liberty of the person inheres in structure that at
first they did not consider a Bill of Rights necessary....
In recent years, perhaps, we have come to think of liberty as defined by that word
in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and as illuminated by the other provisions
of the Bill of Rights. The conception of liberty embraced by the Framers was not so
confined. They used the principles of separation of powers and federalism to secure
liberty in the fundamental political sense of the term, quite in addition to the idea of
freedom from intrusive governmental acts. The idea and the promise were that
when the people delegate some degree of control to a remote central authority, one
branch of government ought not possess the power to shape their destiny without a
sufficient check from the other two. In this vision, liberty demands limits on the
ability of any one branch to influence basic political decisions.
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) at 449, 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
76. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962), 431-33. This concern for the avoidance of sectar-
ian strife within the body politic was articulated in McGowan v. Maryland 366 U. S. 420
(1961), 430, in that "the establishment of a religion was equally feared because of its tenden-
cies to political tyranny and subversion of political authority."
77. Douglas Laycock, "Religious Liberty as Liberty," Journal of Contemporary Legal Is-
sues 7 (1996): 313, 327.
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